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Smothering Freedom of Association:
The Alaska Supreme Court Errs in
Upholding the State’s Blanket Primary
Statute
This Note analyzes the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in
O’Callaghan v. State that upheld the constitutionality of the state’s
blanket primary law.  The Note first describes the factual back-
ground of the case, then discusses United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding freedom of association and election law
challenges.  It  next applies this jurisprudence to test the validity of
the blanket primary law in Alaska and compares the result with
the Alaska Supreme Court’s reasoning in the O’Callaghan deci-
sion.  The Note finds that the blanket primary statute severely
burdens freedom of association, cannot be justified by a compel-
ling state interest, and therefore should have been held unconstitu-
tional.
I. INTRODUCTION
Striking a severe blow to the associational rights of political
party members, the Alaska Supreme Court, in O’Callaghan v.
State,1 upheld as constitutional the state’s blanket primary law. At
issue in the case was whether a state statute providing for a blanket
primary election unconstitutionally violates the associational rights
of the state Republican party and its members by requiring them
to include members of other political parties in the Republican
primary.  
This Note contends that it was error for the O’Callaghan court
to uphold the statute on the basis of merely “legitimate and impor-
tant” state interests.2  Instead, in light of United States Supreme
Court precedent which has established the test to be applied to
election laws burdening associational rights, the Alaska Supreme
Copyright © 1997 by Alaska Law Review
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1. 914 P.2d 1250 (Alaska 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1690 (1997).
2. See id. at 1262-63.
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Court should have required the state to justify the statute by
showing that it was narrowly tailored to advance compelling state
interests.  This Note also argues that the interests asserted by
Alaska to justify the blanket primary are insufficient to withstand
strict scrutiny.
The O’Callaghan majority further erred by disregarding con-
trolling United States Supreme Court precedent, the holdings of
which resolve the issue in O’Callaghan.  This controlling precedent
includes Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,3 which es-
tablished that political parties have the right to determine who
may participate in their candidate selection process, and Demo-
cratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette,4
which held that a political party may not be compelled to abide by
the results of an open primary.
Part II of this Note recounts the facts and holding of
O’Callaghan.  Part III discusses the development of United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding freedom of association
and election law challenges.  Finally, Part IV applies this jurispru-
dence to the facts of O’Callaghan to argue that O’Callaghan was
wrongly decided.
It is instructive to preface this discussion by distinguishing
among the three types of primary election systems.  In a closed
primary, only members of the sponsoring political party may par-
ticipate in the party’s primary election.  Within the class of prima-
ries that are closed, some require affiliation with the party for a pe-
riod of time prior to the primary election, while others permit
voters to declare an affiliation at the time of primary voting.  The
vast majority of states use closed primaries of some variety.5
In an open primary, any voter may vote for candidates for any
party’s nomination, but the voter may vote only for candidates
running for one party’s nomination.  In a blanket primary, any
voter may vote for candidates for any party’s nomination, but — in
contrast to an open primary — the voter may vote for candidates
for the nomination of different political parties for various offices.6
For example, in a blanket primary such as the one envisioned by
the statute at issue, a registered Republican could vote for an in-
dependent for Governor, a Democrat for the U.S. House, and a
Republican for the state Senate.
3. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
4. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
5. See O’Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1254-55.
6. See id.  For further description of closed, open, and blanket primaries, see
JOHN F. BIBBY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND ELECTIONS IN AMERICA 133-37 (3d ed.
1996).
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In addition to Alaska, Louisiana7 and Washington8 have blan-
ket primaries.  California voters recently approved a voter initia-
tive authorizing a blanket primary,9 though it has yet to go into ef-
fect and is being challenged in federal court.10
It is also worthwhile at the outset to consider Alaska’s unique
electoral composition, characterized by its unusually large number
of undeclared and non-partisan voters relative to the number of
party-affiliated voters.  In August 1997, there were 431,976 regis-
tered voters in Alaska.11 Of these, 16,895 were registered inde-
pendents, 72,916 were registered Democrats, 106,983 were regis-
tered Republicans, and 3,157 were registered Green party
members.12 At the same time, there were 142,244 undeclared and
84,780 non-partisan registered voters.13
II. O’CALLAGHAN V. STATE
Alaska Statutes section 15.25.060 provides for a primary
wherein all primary candidates are listed on a single ballot
“without regard to their party affiliation.”14 Any voter may vote for
any of the candidates, regardless of the party affiliation of the
voter or of the candidate.  Known as a blanket primary, this type of
primary election was first enacted in Alaska in 1947 after a refer-
endum.15
In 1990, the Republican Party of Alaska (“RPA”) enacted a
7. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:401 (West 1997).  At press time, the Su-
preme Court of the United States was reviewing a Fifth Circuit decision which
held that Louisiana’s election scheme violates federal laws that set a uniform fed-
eral election day for members of Congress. See Love v. Foster, 90 F.3d 1026 (5th
Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1243 (1997).  In a subsequent clarification of its
decision, the Fifth Circuit observed that Louisiana could conform with federal
law, without necessarily abandoning its open primary system, by rescheduling the
elections.  See Love v. Foster, 100 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 1996).
8. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29.18.200 (1996).
9. See Cal. Prop. 198 (1996) (to be codified at CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2001
(West 1997)).
10. See infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
11. See STATE OF ALASKA DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, NUMBER OF REGISTERED
VOTERS BY PARTY WITHIN DISTRICT (Aug. 4, 1997).
12. See id.
13. See id.  As of November 1994, there were 340,464 registered voters in
Alaska. Of these, 12,936 were registered independents, 59,782 were registered
Democrats, 78,212 were registered Republicans, and 2,558 were registered Green
party members. At the same time, there were 94,282 undeclared and 88,099 non-
partisan registered voters.  See Supplemental Brief of Appellee State at App. 1,
O’Callaghan v. State, 914 P.2d 1250 (Alaska 1996) (No. S-6249, 4338).
14. ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.060 (Michie 1996).
15. See O’Callaghan v. State, 914 P.2d 1250, 1254-56 (Alaska 1996).
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party rule that provided that only registered Republicans, regis-
tered independents, and registered voters who state no preference
of party affiliation may vote in Republican primaries.16  Due to the
obvious conflict between this party rule and the blanket primary
statute, the Republican Party sued the State in federal court, chal-
lenging the statute’s constitutionality.17  Agreeing with the RPA,
Judge James K. Singleton orally announced his “tentative deci-
sion”18 that Alaska’s blanket primary statute infringed on the
RPA’s right to free political association in violation of the United
States Supreme Court’s opinion in Tashjian.19
Subsequent to the judge’s announcement, but prior to his en-
try of judgment in the matter, the RPA and the State agreed to
certain stipulations and to dismissal of the suit. The district court
approved the stipulations and dismissed the case without preju-
dice.  The stipulations provided for two separate ballots for pri-
mary elections, the effect of which was that the 1992 Republican
primary was conducted in accord with the Party rule, not the blan-
ket primary law.20  One ballot listed only Republican candidates,
and was available only to Republican, non-partisan, and unde-
clared voters.  The other ballot listed all other candidates, and was
available to all voters. Voters, of course, could vote only one of
these ballots.
Following the stipulation, and before the 1992 primary, the
Director of Elections adopted emergency temporary regulations,
implementing the two-ballot system described in the stipulation.21
The Director adopted identical permanent regulations prior to the
1994 primary.22 The 1992 and 1994 elections were conducted pur-
suant to these regulations.23
Then, a voter in the 1992 primary election, Mike O’Callaghan,
filed a complaint against the Lieutenant Governor in Alaska Supe-
16. See REPUBLICAN PARTY OF ALASKA, RPA RULES XIV § 1 (1996).
17. See Zawacki v. State, No. A92-414-CV (D. Alaska filed May 26, 1992).
18. Judge Singleton explained his practice of announcing tentative decisions
as follows:
The important thing about a tentative decision is to alert you to the con-
clusions that I have reached legally and factually after reviewing your
materials and the factual materials you have submitted . . . .  So, again by
announcing tentative decisions I am not suggesting that my find is fixed
in stone or that I am absolutely invulnerable to persuasion but only to
suggest to you any factual or legal errors I may be laboring under so that
in the course of your argument you can correct them.
O’Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1253 n.2.
19. See id. at 1252-53.
20. See id. at 1253.
21. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, §§ 28.010-.050 (1992).
22. See id. §§ 28.100-.150 (1993).
23. See O’Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1253.
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rior Court challenging the legality of the 1992 primary election.
O’Callaghan asserted that the stipulated regulations providing for
a two-ballot primary were inconsistent with state election law.  The
State argued that the regulations were valid because of the clear
unconstitutionality of the blanket primary statute under Tashjian.24
The court granted summary judgment for the State, and
O’Callaghan appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court.
The Alaska Supreme Court, in O’Callaghan v. Coghill,25 in-
validated the stipulation because, through the stipulation, the state
had effectively declared a law unconstitutional.  The court noted
that “a stipulation or consent judgment declaring a law unconstitu-
tional is not valid” except in cases of clear unconstitutionality.26
The clear unconstitutionality of the blanket primary statute had
not been established, the court concluded.27  Although the court
declined to decide the constitutionality of the blanket primary
statute, it invited the submission of briefs addressing the question.28
Following the election of a Democratic governor, the state
abruptly changed course and argued that the statute was constitu-
tional.  It was only at this point that the RPA became involved in
the O’Callaghan suit. The court granted the RPA’s motion to in-
tervene, and the RPA argued against the statute’s constitutional-
ity.  Alaskan Voters for an Open Primary were also allowed to in-
tervene.  The Alaska Federation of Natives filed an amicus curiae
brief, and the Alaskan Independence Party filed a submission in
lieu of an amicus curiae brief.  Of these groups, only the RPA ar-
gued that the blanket primary was unconstitutional.
Deciding the issue in O’Callaghan v. State,29 the Alaska Su-
preme Court held that Alaska’s statute providing for a single blan-
ket primary election is constitutional.30  The court declined to apply
strict scrutiny to the blanket primary statute and instead upheld
the law on the basis of state interests that were only “legitimate
and important.”31
The majority conceded that under Alaska’s blanket primary
system, political parties’ association rights are burdened in two
ways: the potential for “raiding”32 is increased and the potential for
24. See O’Callaghan v. Coghill, 888 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Alaska 1995).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1303.
27. See id. at 1305.
28. See id.
29. 914 P.2d 1250 (Alaska 1996).
30. See id. at 1263.
31. Id. at 1262-63.
32. Party raiding has been defined as “the organized switching of blocs of
voters from one party to another in order to manipulate the outcome of the other
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a loss of accountability of candidates to party principles and plat-
form is heightened.33  But whatever the burden, the O’Callaghan
majority reasoned, it is outweighed by the state’s interests in (1)
encouraging voter turnout, (2) maximizing voters’ choices of can-
didates, and (3) ensuring that elected officials have broad-based
constituencies.34  The court stopped short of describing these inter-
ests as “compelling,” instead calling them “legitimate and impor-
tant.”35  The court ordered that the 1996 primary be a blanket pri-
mary, but refused O’Callaghan’s request to order new elections for
1992 and 1994, which had been conducted pursuant to the stipula-
tion.36
Justice Rabinowitz, dissenting, argued that the blanket pri-
mary statute impermissibly burdens the RPA’s political rights of
association in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.37
Relying on several United States Supreme Court cases, Justice
Rabinowitz concluded that the blanket primary law should be
subjected to strict scrutiny because the statute significantly inter-
fered with the right of a political party to nominate candidates of
its choice.38
On June 14, 1996, the RPA filed an application in the United
States Supreme Court, seeking a stay of the Alaska Supreme
Court’s O’Callaghan opinion.  The stay was not granted, and
Alaska’s 1996 primary was conducted as a blanket primary elec-
tion.39  
Also in June 1996, the RPA, seeking reversal of O’Callaghan,
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court.40  Nearly a year after the filing of the certiorari peti-
                                                                                                                                
party’s primary election.”  Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 n.9 (1983).
33. See O’Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1263.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 1262-63.
36. See id. at 1263.
37. See id. at 1264 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
38. See id. (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting) (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428
(1992); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214
(1989); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 379 U.S. 208 (1986); Democratic
Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex. rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981)).
39. See Republican Party of Alaska v. O’Callaghan, 116 S. Ct. 2582 (1996)
(denying application for stay).
40. The questions presented in the petition for certiorari were
(1) Whether this decision conflicts with prior free political association
decisions of [the Supreme Court] such as Burdick v. Takushi, Eu v. San
Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, Tashjian v. Republi-
can Party of Connecticut, and Democratic Party of the United States v.
Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette.
(2) Whether it is a violation of the First Amendment right of free po-
litical association for the State of Alaska to require the Republican Party
to participate in a blanket primary election, in which registered Demo-
CASTRO.CON 12/09/97  11:55 AM
1997] SMOTHERING FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 529
tion, the Court on May 12, 1997, denied cert.41  However, in other
jurisdictions, including the District of Alaska, legal challenges to
blanket and open primaries continue.42
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Right to Associate
Political parties and their “adherents enjoy a constitutionally-
protected right of political association.”43 This right grants parties
and their members “‘the freedom to associate with others for the
common advancement of political beliefs and ideas . . . .’”44
In the first case to enunciate formally the right to freedom of
association,45 Justice Harlan, writing for a unanimous Court, stated
that it “is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of
the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”46  This seminal
case, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,47 established freedom
of association as a separate constitutional right emanating from the
First Amendment’s guarantees of speech, press, petition, and as-
                                                                                                                                
crats and members of other political parties may vote on Republican
nominees, as a condition of placing Republican candidates on the
Alaska general election ballot.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Republican Party of Alaska v. O’Callaghan,
117 S. Ct. 1690 (1997) (No. 95-1962).
41. See Republican Party of Alaska, 117 S. Ct. at 1690.
42. See infra notes 194-213 and accompanying text.
43. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975) (holding that state election
law governing selection of delegates to a national party convention would not be
accorded primacy over the rules of a national political party).
44. Id. (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973)).
45. The Court subsequently recognized two distinct types of freedom of asso-
ciation.  One, the freedom of intimate, or intrinsic, association encompasses per-
sonal choices to enter into and maintain close human relationships, and is pro-
tected as a fundamental element of personal liberty.  See Roberts v. Unites States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (concluding that a Minnesota statute that
compelled Jaycees, a traditionally all-male organization, to accept women into
membership did not abridge the Jaycees’s right to free association).  The other
type of freedom of association, and the one implicated here, is freedom of expres-
sive association, or the right to associate for the purpose of engaging in activities
protected by the First Amendment, such as speech, assembly, worship, and peti-
tion for redress of grievances.  See id. at 622.
46. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (citation
omitted).
47. Id.
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sembly.48  It also made this protection applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.49
With respect to this right, the Court observed, “we have long
understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected
by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with
others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
education, religious, and cultural ends.”50 Significantly, the Court
went on to state that “[f]reedom of association . . . plainly presup-
poses a freedom not to associate [with those not sharing the views
of the group’s members].”51 Similarly, the Court has stated that
“the freedom to associate for the ‘common advancement of politi-
cal beliefs,’ necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the
people who constitute the association, and to limit the association
to those people only.”52
B. The Supreme Court’s Test for Election Laws that Affect the
Right to Associate
Although the Supreme Court has yet to address specifically
the constitutionality of blanket primaries, it has nonetheless devel-
oped a test that may be used to analyze the constitutional validity
of Alaska’s blanket primary statute, and of other election laws that
abridge associational rights.  In Anderson v. Celebrezze,53 the Su-
preme Court first articulated the test to be used in assessing consti-
tutional challenges to election laws.54  A court
must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.  It then must
identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the
[s]tate as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.  In
passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legiti-
macy and strength of each of those interests, it also must consider
the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden
48. See id; see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-08
(1982) (quoting Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15
(1976) (quoting Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460) (reiterating that the First Amendment
protects political association and political expression).  It is self-evident that the
effective exercise of the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly often
requires associational activity.
49. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.
50. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 623.
52. Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450
U.S. 107, 122 (1981) (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56 (1973) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
53. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
54. See id. at 789.
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the plaintiff’s rights.  Only after weighing all these factors is the
reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged
provision is unconstitutional.55
The test, then, weighs the asserted state interests against the injury
alleged and considers the fit between the asserted interests and the
regulation at issue.
The petitioner in Anderson was independent presidential can-
didate John Anderson who, along with three voters, challenged an
Ohio statute that required independent candidates to file in March
to appear on the general election ballot in November.56  Applying
its test, the Court began by assessing the burden imposed by the
statute.  The Court found that setting such an early filing deadline
simultaneously precluded independent candidates from entering
the presidential race after March and limited the effectiveness of
independent candidates who attempted to meet the March dead-
line.57  Therefore, the Court found that the law burdened the asso-
ciational and voting rights of Anderson’s supporters and other
“independent-minded voters.”58  The Court characterized the bur-
den imposed by the early filing deadline as one that “may have a
substantial impact on independent-minded voters.”59
The Court then assessed the legitimacy of Ohio’s asserted in-
terests in voter education, equal treatment for all candidates, and
political party stability, as well as the extent to which the chal-
lenged law serves these interests.60 Although the Court found the
first interest to be “important and legitimate,” it was not convinced
that the regulation was sufficiently related to achieving that inter-
est.61  Similarly, the Court concluded that the state’s interest in
equal treatment of partisan and independent candidates “simply is
not achieved by imposing the March filing deadline on both.”62  Fi-
nally, the Court rejected the interest in political stability because
“the early filing deadline is not precisely drawn to protect the par-
ties from ‘intraparty feuding,’ whatever legitimacy that state goal
may have in a [p]residential election.”63  In short, the law failed ra-
tional-basis review.  The Court ultimately invalidated the election
provision because its burden “unquestionably outweigh[ed] the
55. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
56. See id. at 782-83.
57. See id at 792.
58. Id. at 790-92.
59. Id. at 790-91.
60. See id. at 796-806.
61. See id at 796.
62. Id. at 801.
63. Id. at 805.
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[s]tate’s minimal interest in imposing a March deadline.”64
In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,65 the Supreme
Court applied the Anderson test to invalidate Connecticut’s closed
primary statute, which required voters in any political party pri-
mary to be registered members of that party.66  The state Republi-
can Party, seeking to allow unaffiliated voters to participate in the
Republican primary, challenged the validity of Connecticut’s
closed primary system.  Because the Connecticut law required vot-
ers in any party primary to be registered members of that party, it
precluded registered voters who were not affiliated with any party
from voting in the Republican primary.  The Republican Party,
which had previously adopted a party rule permitting unaffiliated,
or “independent,” voters to vote in its primary, argued that the law
deprived the Party of its right under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to enter into political association with individuals of
its own choosing.67  The District Court, Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, and Supreme Court each agreed, holding that the
statute impermissibly interfered with the Republican Party’s free-
dom of association rights.68
The Court began its analysis by quoting its earlier opinions for
the proposition that “‘[c]onstitutional challenges to specific provi-
sions of a [s]tate’s election laws . . . cannot be resolved by any
‘litmus-paper test’ that will separate valid from invalid restric-
tions.’”69  Instead, the Court must follow the test previously stated
in Anderson v. Celebrezze.70
Applying the Anderson test, the Court found that the chal-
lenged laws burdened the right of the Party and its members to as-
sociate freely, noting that “the freedom to join together in further-
ance of common political beliefs ‘necessarily presupposes the
64. Id. at 806.
65. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
66. See id. at 210-11.
67. See id. at 213.
68. See id. at 213, 224-25.
69. Id. at 213 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 (quoting Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974))).
70. The Court must
“consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plain-
tiff seeks to vindicate.  It then must identify and evaluate the precise in-
terests put forward by the [s]tate as justifications for the burden imposed
by its rule.  In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the
legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must consider
the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the
plaintiff’s rights.”
Id. at 214 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
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freedom to identify the people who constitute the association.’”71
The statute “limit[ed] the Party’s associational opportunities at the
crucial juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be
translated into concerted action, and hence to political power in
the community.”72  Apparently this burden was sufficiently weighty
to justify strict scrutiny review, for the Court went on to apply this
most stringent standard, in which the issue is whether the state law
is “narrowly tailored . . . [to advance] the [s]tate’s compelling in-
terests.”73
Connecticut had asserted four interests, which it characterized
as compelling: minimizing the administrative burden of the pri-
mary system; preventing raiding; avoiding voter confusion and
providing for informed voter decisions; and protecting the respon-
sibility of party government.74  The Court ultimately concluded
that each of these interests was “insubstantial,” and consequently
strict scrutiny was not satisfied.75
The Court found that the first asserted interest — that of ad-
ministrative burden — was “not a sufficient basis . . . for infringing
appellees’ First Amendment rights.”76  The interest in preventing
party raiding, while legitimate, was not implicated, because the
election code did not prevent raids but actually “assist[ed] a raid
by independents,” who, under the law, could register as Republi-
cans at the last minute and thus implement an eleventh-hour raid.77
The Court classified as merely “legitimate” the state’s interest in
preventing voter confusion and providing for educated and respon-
sible voter decisions.78  Finally, the Court disposed of the fourth as-
serted interest — that of promoting responsiveness of elected offi-
cials and strengthening the effectiveness of parties — by noting
that, even if these interests were served, a state “‘may not constitu-
tionally substitute is own judgment for that of the Party.’”79  Con-
necticut was attempting to justify its law on the ground that it pro-
tected the integrity of the Party against the Party itself; this the
state may not do.80
71. Id. (quoting Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel.
LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981)).
72. Id. at 216.
73. Id. at 217.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 225.
76. Id. at 218.
77. Id. at 219.
78. Id. at 221-22.
79. Id. at 224 (quoting Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex
rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 123-24 (1981)).
80. See id.
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After Tashjian it is clear that political parties have a constitu-
tional right to permit unaffiliated voters to participate in their pri-
maries, even in states with election statutes restricting voting in
primaries to registered party members.  Insofar as closed primary
statutes bar participation of unaffiliated voters in party primaries
despite party rules permitting the participation of such voters,
these statutes are unconstitutional.  Pursuant to party rules, then, a
state must permit independent/unaffiliated voters as well as party
members to vote in the party primary, even if state law establishes
a closed primary.81
Then in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Committee,82 the Court articulated a stricter test for assessing the
constitutionality of state election laws.83  This iteration of the An-
derson test would apply strict scrutiny whenever associational
rights are burdened, apparently without regard to the degree of the
burden imposed.  The now familiar first step entails determining
whether the law burdens rights protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments.84 Citing Tashjian and Anderson, the Court
then outlined the next step of the inquiry: “[i]f the challenged law
burdens the rights of political parties and their members, it can
survive constitutional scrutiny only if the state shows that it ad-
vances a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.”85  Later, the Court emphasized “[b]ecause the chal-
lenged laws burden the associational rights of political parties and
their members, the question is whether they serve a compelling
state interest.”86
The plaintiffs in Eu challenged provisions of California’s elec-
tion code, which banned primary endorsements by the official gov-
erning bodies of political parties and imposed various restrictions
on the internal governance of parties.87  Specifically, the latter
group of restrictions dictated the organization and composition of
party governing bodies, limited the term of office of party chairs,
and required that the chair rotate between residents of northern
and southern California.88
81. Whether the present-day Court would reach the same result in Tashjian,
however, is an open question.  Of the five justices forming the Tashjian majority,
none remain on the Court, while all of the Tashjian dissenters remain.  Nonethe-
less, at this time Tashjian remains good law.
82. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
83. See id. at 222.
84. See id. (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).
85. Id. at 222 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 231.
87. See id. at 216.
88. See id.
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Applying the modified Anderson test first to the endorsement
ban, the Eu Court found that the state election code provisions
barring primary endorsements by parties burdened First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights, namely political parties’ freedom of
speech and freedom of association.89  Moving to the second step of
the analysis, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the provision.90
The Court held that the law was not narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.91
The State had offered two interests, stable government and
protection of voters from confusion and undue influence.92  As to
the first, the Court concluded that California had failed to show
the nexus between stable government and a ban on party en-
dorsements.93  In rejecting the argument that an interest in stable
government includes an interest in party stability, the Court cited
prior cases in which it had drawn a distinction between interparty
and intraparty feuds.  Quoting Tashjian, the Court wrote, “a [s]tate
may enact laws ‘to prevent the disruption of the political parties
from without’ but not, as in this case, laws ‘to prevent the parties
from taking internal steps affecting their own process for the selec-
tion of candidates.’”94 Moreover, it is not for the state to attempt to
save a political party “from pursuing self-destructive acts,” as this
would entail substituting the state’s judgment for that of the
party.95  In conclusion, the Court stated, “preserving party unity
during a primary is not a compelling state interest.”96
Turning to the second and only remaining interest asserted by
the State, the Court noted that the state has a “legitimate interest
in fostering an informed electorate.”97  But, the Court reasoned,
this interest was not served by a ban on party endorsements, a rule
which actually restricts the flow of information to voters.98
The Court then turned to the other challenged code provisions
and found that the provisions regulating internal governance of
party organizations burdened political parties’ freedom of associa-
tion rights by “prevent[ing] the political parties from governing
89. See id. at 222-25.
90. See id. at 225-26.
91. See id. at 229.
92. See id. at 226.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 227 (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208,
224 (1986)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 228.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 228-29 (emphasis added).
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themselves with the structure they think best.”99 Significantly,
given the character of the RPA’s claim in O’Callaghan, the Court
observed that
the associational rights at stake are much stronger than those we
credited in Tashjian.  There, we found that a party’s right to free
association embraces a right to allow registered voters who are
not party members to vote in the party’s primary.  Here, party
members do not seek to associate with nonparty members, but
only with one another in freely choosing their party leaders.100
Because the laws burdened associational rights, the Court
strictly scrutinized the provisions and the interests they were in-
tended to serve.101  The State asserted that its regulation of internal
party governance served to preserve the integrity of the election
process.102  The Court found that California had failed to show that
these regulations were necessary to ensure a fair and orderly elec-
tion process, a process which is, the Court observed, most directly
impacted by a party’s external — not internal — affairs.103 Thus,
none of the challenged election code provisions in Eu survived
strict scrutiny review.104
In Norman v. Reed,105 the Court applied strict scrutiny to strike
down election laws that limited the right of political association.
The Illinois election laws at issue restricted ballot access by pro-
hibiting use by a new political party of the name of an established
party106 and effectively requiring more signatures to get on the
ballot in a multidistrict political subdivision than required to get on
the statewide ballot.107  
Noting that it had “required any severe restriction to be nar-
rowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling impor-
tance,”108 the Court apparently deemed these restrictions severe,
for it proceeded to apply strict scrutiny to both measures.  Ad-
dressing the first challenged law — the prohibition against the use
of the party’s name — the Court stated that it was “far broader
than necessary to serve the [s]tate’s asserted interests.”109  Rather,
the state’s interest in preventing misrepresentation and electoral
99. Id. at 230.
100. Id. at 230-31.
101. See id. at 231.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 232.
104. See id. at 233.
105. 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
106. See id. at 285.
107. See id. at 282-83.
108. Id. at 289 (citing Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440
U.S. 173, 184, 186 (1979)).
109. Id. at 290.
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confusion could be served “merely by requiring the candidates to
get formal permission to use the name from the established party
they seek to represent.”110
As for the signature requirement, the Court stated that
“Illinois has not chosen the most narrowly tailored means of ad-
vancing” its interest in ensuring that the electoral support for new
parties in a multidistrict political subdivision extends to every dis-
trict.111  The Court observed that there were other, less restrictive
means of advancing this interest.112  Thus, strict scrutiny was not
satisfied and the Court struck down the contested laws.
In Burdick v. Takushi,113 the Court synthesized the test laid out
in Anderson with its subsequent applications of that test in the
following formulation:
[T]he rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state
election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged
regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected to
“severe” restrictions, the regulation must be “narrowly drawn to
advance a state interest of compelling importance.”  But when a
state election law provision imposes only “reasonable, nondis-
criminatory restrictions” upon the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of voters, “the [s]tate’s important regulatory
interests are generally sufficient to justify” the restrictions.114
In Burdick, Alan Burdick, a registered voter in Honolulu,
challenged Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting as unconstitu-
tional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.115 Burdick
sought to require the state to provide for the casting, tallying, and
publication of write-in votes.116  Significantly, however, Hawaii’s
election code already provided three distinct means through which
a voter’s chosen candidate may appear on the primary ballot.117
One of these mechanisms was a designated nonpartisan primary
ballot on which any nonpartisan may be placed by filing nominat-
ing papers containing between fifteen and twenty-five signatures,
depending on the office sought, sixty days before the primary.118
The Court found the prohibition on write-in voting to be “a
110. Id.
111. Id. at 294.
112. See id. at 293-94.
113. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
114. Id. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992); Anderson
v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
115. See id. at 430.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 435-36.
118. See id. at 436.
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very limited”119 burden on voters’ rights.  Given the multiple other
ways Hawaii allowed candidates to appear on the ballot,  “any
burden on voters’ freedom of choice and association is borne only
by those who fail to identify their candidate of choice until days
before the primary.”120
Turning next to the interests asserted by Hawaii, the Court
stated that “[b]ecause we have already concluded that the burden
is slight, the [s]tate need not establish a compelling interest to tip
the constitutional scales in its direction.”121  Hawaii asserted two
interests in barring write-in votes: guarding against the possibility
of unrestrained factionalism at the general election and preventing
party raiding.122  The Court deemed both interests “legitimate” and
determined that the ban was “a reasonable way of accomplishing
[the] goal” of preventing party raiding.123  Thus, the minimal level
of review was satisfied.  Burdick illustrates that not all state elec-
tion laws necessarily impose so high a burden as to warrant the ap-
plication of strict scrutiny.  Where the burden is judged to be quite
modest, the Court will apply considerably less scrutiny to the
challenged laws.
Most recently, in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,124
the Court applied the Anderson test to Minnesota election laws
that prohibited a candidate from appearing on the ballot as the
candidate of more than one party.125  This practice of “nomination
by more than one political party of the same candidate for the
same office in the same general election” is known as “fusion.”126
The Supreme Court determined that the burdens imposed by the
fusion ban “though not trivial — are not severe.”127  Therefore, be-
cause strict scrutiny was not warranted, the Court applied only a
minimal level of review, and the fusion ban survived.128
The Timmons Court drew a distinction between the burden of
a fusion ban and the more weighty burden of state laws such as
those at issue in Eu and Tashjian.129  The Court reiterated that
“regulation of political parties’ internal affairs and core associa-
119. Id. at 437.
120. Id. at 436-37.
121. Id. at 439.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 440.
124. 117 S. Ct. 1364 (1997).
125. See id. at 1370.
126. Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 197-98 (8th Cir.
1996).
127. See Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1372.
128. See id. at 1372, 1375.
129. See id. at 1370-71.
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tional activities,” such as that found in Eu and Tashjian, imposed
too great a burden to withstand constitutional scrutiny.130  The
Court contrasted those regulations with ones that merely preclude
a candidate who is already on the ballot from being nominated by
a second political party.131  A regulation of the latter variety, the
Court noted, simply limits candidates to a single nomination, but
does not preclude their nomination by any one party, so long as
they are not already the nominee of another party.132  Therefore, it
is only a question of whether a candidate’s name may appear on
the ballot once or more than once, not whether the candidate’s
name may appear once or not at all.133 The burden of such a regula-
tion, the Court concluded, is “not severe.”134
Because of the nature of the burden imposed, “the [s]tate’s as-
serted regulatory interests need only be ‘sufficiently weighty to jus-
tify the limitation’ imposed on the Party’s rights.”135  Minnesota’s
interests in preserving the integrity of its election processes and
maintaining the stability of their political system were sufficient to
withstand this minimal review.  The fusion ban was upheld.136
The foregoing review of United States Supreme Court juris-
prudence thus makes clear that the balancing test first articulated
in Anderson, and consistently applied by the Court since Ander-
son, is the appropriate standard by which to assess the validity of
state laws infringing on the freedom of association.
C. State Law Versus Party Rule: The United States Supreme
Court Establishes the Primacy of Party Rules
In addition to the Supreme Court precedent establishing the
appropriate test for laws burdening the right to associate, prece-
dent also exists that specifically pertains to conflicts between state
law and party rules. Given the conflict between Alaska’s blanket
primary law and the RPA’s rule, such precedent is of obvious rele-
vance. The United States Supreme Court has twice before been
confronted with state laws that conflict with party rules, and, in
each instance, has upheld the validity of the party rules.
In Cousins v. Wigoda,137 the first case upholding party rules
130. Id. at 1370.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 1372.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992); Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
788 (1983))).
136. See id. at 1373, 1375.
137. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
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despite contrary provisions of the state election code, the Court in-
voked a political party’s constitutionally-protected right of political
association to hold that state election law governing selection of
delegates to a national party convention would not be accorded
primacy over the rules of a national political party.138  Instead,
delegates selected in private caucuses, not the delegates selected in
the state-run primary election, were permitted to represent voters
at the national party convention.139
Later, in Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex
rel. LaFollette,140 the Court upheld the right of national political
parties to refuse to seat delegates at their conventions who were
chosen through state selection processes that violated party rules.
The Wisconsin election code allowed voters not affiliated with the
Democratic party to vote in the Democratic primary.141 The rules
of the National Democratic Party, however, provided that only
persons willing to affiliate publicly with the party could participate
in the process of selecting delegates to the party’s national conven-
tion.142  The conflict arose because the Wisconsin law required
delegates to vote at the National Convention in accordance with
the results of the primary election.143  Thus, the party rules were
violated not by the open nature of the primary, but rather by the
state mandate that party delegates be bound by the results of that
primary.144
In holding that states may not force a party to honor the re-
sults of an open primary by requiring delegates to vote in accord
with those primary results,145 the Court made clear that it was not
deciding the constitutional validity of open primaries; rather its de-
138. See id. at 487-91.
139. See id. at 478-79. The 59 delegates elected pursuant to the Illinois election
code had sued to prevent the 59 delegates chosen according to party rules from
being seated at the convention.  The Illinois Appellate Court agreed with the po-
sition of the former group of delegates, declaring that the “right to sit as a dele-
gate representing Illinois at the national nominating convention is governed ex-
clusively by the Illinois Election Code” and, further, that “[t]he interest of the
state in protecting the effective right to participate in primaries is superior to
whatever other interests the party itself might wish to protect.”  Wigoda v. Cous-
ins, 302 N.E.2d 614, 626, 629 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). The Supreme Court reversed,
finding that this position violated the associational rights of the latter group of
delegates and of the National Democratic Party, and undermined the Party’s ef-
fectiveness in selecting candidates.  See Cousins, 419 U.S. at 489-90.
140. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
141. See id. at 110-11.
142. See id. at 109.
143. See id. at 112.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 126.
CASTRO.CON 12/09/97  11:55 AM
1997] SMOTHERING FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 541
cision addressed only whether a state, once it has chosen an open
primary format in which non-party members may vote, may force a
national political party to honor the results of that primary, when
those results were reached in violation of national party rules.146
Relying on its decision in Cousins, the Court found this violation
of party rules to be impermissible under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.147  The Supreme Court made the observation, now
particularly relevant in evaluating O’Callaghan, that it has
“recognized that the inclusion of persons unaffiliated with a politi-
cal party may seriously distort its collective decisions — thus im-
pairing the party’s essential functions — and that political parties
may accordingly protect themselves ‘from intrusion by those with
adverse political principles.’”148  The Court also recalled that
the freedom to associate for the “common advancement of po-
litical beliefs” necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify
the people who constitute the association and to limit the asso-
ciation to those people only.  “Any interference with the free-
dom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the free-
dom of its adherents.” 149
The Court in Democratic Party never reached the application
of any standard of review, since it found all of the asserted inter-
ests to be unrelated to the imposition of voting requirements on
party delegates.150  Although it did not specifically state that strict
scrutiny applied, the Court did refer to “compelling interest[s],”
suggesting that strict scrutiny would have been the appropriate
standard of review in such a case.151
146. See id. at 120.
147. See id. at 121-24.  The Court in Democratic Party framed the issue as
“whether the State may compel the National Party to seat a delegation chosen in
a way that violates the rules of the Party” and noted that “this issue was resolved,
we believe, in Cousins v. Wigoda.”  Id. at 121 (citation omitted).
148. Id. at 122 (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1952)).
149. Id. (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56 (1973); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).
150. The Court wrote,
The State asserts a compelling interest in preserving the overall integrity
of the electoral process, providing secrecy of the ballot, increasing voter
participation in primaries, and preventing harassment of voters . . . all [of
which] . . . go to the conduct of the Presidential preference primary —
not to the imposition of voting requirements upon . . . delegates.
Id. at 124-25.
151. Id.
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IV. THE ALASKA SUPREME COURT ERRED IN
O’CALLAGHAN V. STATE
A. The Majority Opinion
Before discussing the errors of the O’Callaghan majority, it is
useful to recount briefly the reasoning of the majority opinion. The
Alaska Supreme Court began its opinion by outlining the back-
ground of the litigation and then turned to the standard of review
it would apply.  The court correctly identified the Anderson bal-
ancing test, as reiterated in Burdick, as the standard by which elec-
tion laws abridging freedom of association must be judged.  The
court quoted at great length, and almost without comment, the
United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Burdick.152
Then the O’Callaghan majority described the three major
types of primary elections and discussed the history of the blanket
primary law in Alaska.153  Next, the court began a section that it cu-
riously termed “Relevant Case Law.”154  The court first cited a pre-
Tashjian, Washington state case, which had facts similar to those of
O’Callaghan.155  In that case, a challenge to Washington’s blanket
primary law, the Washington court had relied upon two Supreme
Court cases in which the Court had upheld closed primary statutes
that had been challenged by excluded voters.156  The outcome of
one of these cases, Nader v. Schaffer,157 which the Supreme Court
had affirmed without comment, was effectively reversed by the
Court when it subsequently decided Tashjian.158
Then, turning to, and ultimately discounting, the relevant
precedent from the United States Supreme Court, the majority ac-
knowledged that in Democratic Party a party rule prevailed over
contrary state law.  Nonetheless, the majority attempted to distin-
guish the holding of Democratic Party “because the Court did not
invalidate the state open primary.”159  Next, the court focused on
152. See O’Callaghan v. State, 914 P.2d 1250, 1252-54 (Alaska 1996).
153. See id. at 1254-56.
154. Id. at 1256.
155. See id. (citing Heavey v. Chapman, 611 P.2d 1256 (1980)).
156. See Heavey, 611 P.2d at 1258 (citing Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752
(1973); Nader v. Schaffer, 429 U.S. 989 (1976)).
157. 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn.), aff’d, 429 U.S. 989 (1976).
158. Surprisingly, this fact is all but ignored by the majority in O’Callaghan.
While the Heavey court, at the time of its decision, may well have been correct in its
reliance on Nader, the same cannot be said of the Alaska Supreme Court’s reliance
on Nader after Tashjian had preempted Nader.
159. O’Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1259. But, of course, the validity of the state’s
open primary was not the issue decided by the Court in Democratic Party; indeed
the Democratic Party Court expressly declined to consider the issue of the constitu-
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Tashjian, emphasizing that the Tashjian holding “does not confer
per se validity on party rules which conflict with a state’s primary
election laws.”160  Then, shifting from the Supreme Court cases, the
majority cited two California cases, one from a state court and one
from a federal appellate court, both upholding state laws against
contrary party rules.161
Turning to the assessment of the interests involved, the ma-
jority noted that the blanket primary statute burdens political par-
ties’ association rights in two ways: the potential for raiding is in-
creased and the potential for a loss of accountability of candidates
to party principles and platform is heightened.162  The court con-
cluded, however, that these risks were not considerably greater
than they would be in the closed primary that the RPA wished to
conduct.  It reached this conclusion without the benefit of the
RPA’s evidence on the matter.163
Finally, the majority considered the state’s interests in en-
couraging voter turnout, maximizing voters’ choices of candidates,
and ensuring that elected officials have broad-based constituen-
cies.164  The court characterized these interests as “legitimate and
important.”165 Though the court never articulated which level of
scrutiny it would apply pursuant to the Anderson test, it apparently
did not choose strict scrutiny since these “legitimate and impor-
tant” state interests were sufficient to uphold the blanket primary
statute.  The majority concluded by declaring that the 1992 and
1994 primaries were conducted illegally.166
B. The O’Callaghan Majority Erred in its Application of the
Anderson Test
As the preceding review of United States Supreme Court ju-
risprudence illustrates, the Anderson balancing test must be ap-
plied to any state regulation infringing on rights of free association.
The Court has utilized this test to assess the constitutionality of
challenged election laws in Anderson, Tashjian, Eu, Norman,
                                                                                                                                
tional validity of an open primary statute.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 1260 (citing Green Party of Cal. v. Jones, 31 Cal. App. 4th 747
(Ct. App. 1995); Lightfoot v. Eu, 964 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 919 (1993)).
162. See id. at 1263.
163. In a footnote, the court declined the RPA’s suggestion that the case be
remanded to allow the RPA to submit evidence, which it had previously been un-
able to do as a consequence of joining the litigation late as an intervenor. See id.
at 1261 n.16.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 1262-63.
166. See id. at 1263.
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Burdick, and Timmons. The test, as previously noted, weighs the
character and magnitude of the injury to association rights against
the asserted state interests, while considering the necessity of the
regulation for achieving those interests.
1. Assessment of the burden imposed by the blanket primary
statute.  Application of the Anderson test begins with an
assessment of the burden imposed by the challenged law.  To
comprehend fully the burden imposed by Alaska’s blanket primary
statute, we must first consider the role of the primary election in
Alaska’s political system.  Under Alaska’s statutory scheme, the
only way a political party167 may have candidates in the general
election is for the candidates to be selected through the primary
election.168  Furthermore, the party has no role, under the election
statute, in selecting candidates for the primary election.169  Indeed,
the only required affiliation between a primary candidate and the
party he purports to represent in the primary is that he be
registered to vote as a member of that party.170  The statute
requires no other connection between primary candidates and
their parties.171
Since a party has no means of selecting who can represent it in
the primary, the primary election itself is the party’s only opportu-
nity to express its collective preference for a nominee for the gen-
eral election.  But because voting in the primary election is open to
non-party members, the party cannot use the primary election to
select the nominee of its choice, free of the influence of non-party
members.  Consequently, the party never has the opportunity to
select a candidate by a process in which only its members or others
with whom the party wishes to associate participate.
167. A political party is statutorily defined as “an organized group of voters
that represents a political program and that nominated a candidate for governor
who received at least 3% of the total votes cast at the preceding general election
for governor.” ALASKA STAT. § 15.60.010(20) (Michie 1996).
168. See id. § 15.25.010.
169. See id. § 15.25.030.  Any member of a political party who conforms with
the statutory requirements pertaining to filing procedure, age, citizenship, and
residency may “file a declaration of candidacy.”  Id.
170. See id. § 15.25.030(a)(16).
171. Justice Rabinowitz, in his O’Callaghan dissent, highlighted one way a
party might have some control over who represents it in a primary:
If, for example, only those candidates who received a certain percentage
of votes at a party convention or caucus could run in the primary under
the party’s name, then the party would be assured that the nominees
have received at least some affirmative approval from the party.  As it
stands, the party has no control over which candidates use its name.
 O’Callaghan v. State, 914 P.2d 1250, 1265 n.4 (Alaska 1996) (Rabinowitz, J., dis-
senting).
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The burden imposed by Alaska’s blanket primary, then, is to
prevent political parties and their members from selecting a nomi-
nee of their choice to represent the party in the general election.
As Justice Rabinowitz stated in his dissenting opinion in
O’Callaghan, “Taken together, these laws mandate that any or-
ganization which wins more than three percent in the prior election
for governor [the defining characteristic of a “party” under the
statute] loses the right to nominate the candidate of its choice.”172
This is a substantial burden.  Indeed, it goes to the heart of the
constitutional right of freedom of association.  When a political
party is denied the opportunity to select a candidate through a
process in which the only participants are those with whom the
party wishes to associate, the party has effectively lost its constitu-
tional right of association.
A fundamental aspect of the right of association, as well as a
central function of political parties, is choosing the person who will
represent the party and its members in the general election. Surely
the matter of who will carry the party name in the general election
is a significant one.  Voters in the general election will ascribe cer-
tain positions or beliefs to candidates who are nominees of the
Democratic party and will ascribe other positions or beliefs to can-
didates who are nominees of the Republican party.  Voters likely
will also assume certain things about the parties and party mem-
bers based on the positions and conduct of the nominees who carry
the parties’ names.  Consequently, parties and their adherents have
a substantial interest in retaining the opportunity to choose their
nominee by means of a process in which only they participate. The
denial of such an opportunity constitutes a severe abridgement of
the associational rights of parties and their members.
Furthermore, the blanket primary law has ramifications be-
yond political parties and their members.  Because the law forces
the opening of the nominee selection process to persons who are
not party members, voters in the general election will rightly won-
der if candidates bearing the labels of Democratic nominee, Re-
publican nominee, or Libertarian nominee have actually garnered
majority support from the parties they purport to represent.  In-
deed, under current law, it would be possible for the “Republican”
nominee to receive more votes from registered Democrats than
from Republican party members and for the “Democratic” nomi-
nee to receive more votes from registered Republicans than from
Democratic party members.173  Because this potentiality exists, per-
172. Id. at 1266 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
173. This may be the result of intentional raiding, or it simply may be caused
by the failure of party members to participate in the primary in numbers sufficient
to outnumber votes cast by well-intentioned non-party members.  Regardless of
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sons voting in a general election for nominees selected through a
blanket primary have less reliable information than they would
have absent the blanket primary.  These voters no longer know, for
example, whether or not the nominee bearing the “Republican”
appellation actually has the support of most Republicans. Thus,
the party nomination loses much of its meaning and its ability to
impart information to voters in the general election.
2. Strict scrutiny of Alaska’s interests in a blanket primary.
Because of the severe burden the blanket primary places on
associational rights, Anderson and its progeny mandate the
application of strict scrutiny to Alaska’s blanket primary statute.
Therefore, it was erroneous for the O’Callaghan court to uphold
the statute on the basis of merely “legitimate and important” state
interests.174  Instead, the Alaska Supreme Court should have
required the state to justify the statute by showing that it was
narrowly tailored to advance compelling state interests.
Had the court utilized the appropriate level of scrutiny, it
would have struck down the blanket primary law, for Alaska’s in-
terests in a blanket primary cannot survive strict scrutiny.  Indeed,
rarely, if ever, can any interest survive strict scrutiny.175  None of
the interests asserted by the states in Tashjian, Eu, or Norman
were sufficient to survive this most intense level of review by the
United States Supreme Court.
Alaska argued that three interests were served by the blanket
primary: maximizing voters’ freedom of choice among candidates,
encouraging voter turnout, and ensuring that elected officials are
representative of the people they govern by forcing parties to have
a broad cross-section of support from the voters. To be sure, none
of these interests is illegitimate.  However, to survive strict scrutiny
more is required.  The interests must be compelling and the statute
must be narrowly tailored to serve those interests.
First, Alaska asserted its interest in maximizing voters’ free-
dom of choice.  The state, however, has not utilized the least re-
strictive means of serving this interest.  For example, Alaska could
more effectively maximize voter choice, without infringing on as-
sociational rights of parties and their members, simply by permit-
ting write-in voting in a separate, non-partisan primary.  Under
                                                                                                                                
the cause, it is the prospect that this could occur, that is of import.
174. O’Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1262-63.
175. The Supreme Court has observed, “Only rarely are statutes sustained in
the face of strict scrutiny. As one commentator observed, strict-scrutiny review is
‘strict’ in theory but usually ‘fatal’ in fact.” Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 n.6
(1984) (citing Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term — Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)).
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such a system, all voters not participating in a party’s primary
would vote a ballot containing the names of all unaffiliated candi-
dates and space to write in the name of any person of the voter’s
choice.  Thereby, voter choice would be truly maximized, as voters
would not be limited to persons whose names appear on the ballot.
The person receiving the most votes in this contest would become
the “write-in/unaffiliated nominee” in the general election.  Be-
cause the state has failed to utilize the most narrowly tailored
means of furthering this interest, strict scrutiny is not satisfied.
The State also asserted an interest in encouraging voter par-
ticipation.  The State did not specify whether its interest is in en-
couraging participation of party voters or unaffiliated voters.176
Assuming, arguendo, that the state’s interest is in encouraging the
participation of unaffiliated voters, and further assuming the mer-
its of this interest, strict scrutiny is not satisfied. This interest is just
as effectively served by the less restrictive method of permitting
write-in voting in a non-partisan primary, as described above.  In
that system, virtually every registered voter would be able to par-
ticipate and to cast a ballot for his candidate of choice, whether or
not his choice appeared in print on a ballot. In this way, the asso-
ciational rights of parties and their members would not be
abridged, but voter turnout would be maximized.  Thus, the means
Alaska has utilized is not necessary to further this state interest,
and strict scrutiny is not satisfied.
Finally, Alaska asserted an interest in ensuring that the
“officers elected are representative of the people to be governed”
and that the blanket primary “forces the major political parties to
have a broad cross-section of support from the voters.”177  There is
not even a rational relation between the blanket primary and this
interest.  A primary, whether open or closed, does not “elect rep-
resentatives of the people to be governed”; that is the function of
the general election.  Rather, a primary determines party nomi-
nees; these nominees, of course, later face off in the general elec-
tion in which representatives are elected.  The time for rallying “a
broad cross-section of support from the voters” is the general elec-
tion campaign, after party nominees have been chosen by party
176. If the interest is in encouraging the participation of voters who are party
members, then even rational basis review is not satisfied.  Such an interest is not
rationally related to the blanket primary statute.  This is so because party mem-
bers actually will be less inclined to participate in a selection process that is adul-
terated by the participation of members of opposing parties, and more inclined to
participate in the selection of a nominee when the process is more meaningful and
the nominee selected actually is their choice and their choice alone.
177. O’Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1262.
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members.178  Thus rational basis review, much less strict scrutiny, is
not satisfied.
Moreover, the interests asserted by Alaska fare poorly when
considered in light of the substantial burden imposed by the stat-
ute on the right to associate of political parties and their members.
The blanket primary operates to bar political parties and their
members from selecting a nominee of their choice for the general
election, which is a fundamental function of political parties and
one that is integral to the right to associate.
C. The O’Callaghan Majority Disregarded Controlling Supreme
Court Precedent
Beyond misapplying the test for assessing the constitutionality
of election laws, the O’Callaghan court disregarded United States
Supreme Court precedent indicating that the blanket primary stat-
ute should be struck down.  First there is Tashjian.  Significantly,
the Tashjian Court acknowledged the critical importance to a po-
litical party of the selection of a party nominee.179 State regulations,
such as those challenged in Tashjian and O’Callaghan, which in-
fringe on a party’s freedom to determine who may vote in its pri-
maries “limit the Party’s associational opportunities at the crucial
juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be trans-
lated into concerted action, and hence to political power in the
community.”180
More than this, the holding in Tashjian establishes that free-
dom of association affords political parties the right to determine
who may participate in their nominee selection process, and inso-
far as state law conflicts with the party’s determination in this re-
gard, the law is invalid. In striking down state law limits upon who
may participate in party primaries, the Court wrote that “the
Party’s determination of the boundaries of its own association, and
of the structure which best allows it to pursue its political goals, is
protected by the Constitution.”181  The Court affirmed the Second
Circuit’s holding that a state law which “‘substantially interferes
with the Republican Party’s [F]irst [A]mendment right to define its
178. Besides, with or without a blanket primary, party members have a strong
and obvious incentive to select a nominee for the general election who can attract “a
broad cross-section of support from the voters.”  If a party fails to choose such a
nominee, it likely will lose the general election, especially in a state such as Alaska
where the number of undeclared and non-partisan voters significantly exceeds the
membership of the “major” political parties.  Therefore, the blanket primary statute
is not necessary to achieve this asserted interest.
179. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 215-16 (1986).
180. Id. at 216.
181. Id. at 224.
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associational boundaries . . . and engage in effective political asso-
ciation’” is unconstitutional.182 Thus, while Tashjian dealt with a
closed rather than an open primary, it plainly established the right
of parties to define their associational boundaries, a right which in-
cludes the determination of who may participate in the party’s se-
lection of a nominee.  In this way, Tashjian controls the outcome in
O’Callaghan.
Democratic Party is also directly pertinent to the issue in
O’Callaghan.  In Democratic Party, of course, state law opened the
Democratic primary to voters not affiliated with the Democratic
party; the party wished to restrict participation to party members
only. There the Court held that the state may not control the proc-
ess whereby a political party selects delegates for its national con-
vention.183  Justice Rabinowitz correctly observed in his
O’Callaghan dissent that “[d]elegates select candidates, and there-
fore interference in the delegate selection process is interference in
the candidate selection process.”184  Thus, Democratic Party com-
pels the conclusion that state interference in a party’s nominee se-
lection process, like state interference in a party’s selection of
delegates, is impermissible.185  And so, in both Tashjian and Demo-
cratic Party, party rules ultimately prevailed over the state laws
which attempted to close and open, respectively, the selection
process.
The Court in Eu, as well, made several observations that are
useful in evaluating O’Callaghan.  First, the Court noted that “[a]
[s]tate’s broad power to regulate the time, place, and manner of
elections ‘does not extinguish the [s]tate’s responsibility to observe
the limits established by the First Amendment rights of the
[s]tate’s citizens.’”186  Continuing, the Court wrote,
Freedom of association means not only that an individual voter
has the right to associate with the political party of her choice,
but also that a political party has a right to “‘identify the people
182. Id. at 229 (quoting Republican Party of Conn. v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265,
283 (2d Cir. 1985)).
183. See Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette,
450 U.S. 107, 126 (1981).
184. O’Callaghan v. State, 914 P.2d 1250, 1266 (Alaska 1996) (Rabinowitz, J.,
dissenting).
185. Cf. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491 (1975) (upholding party rules
over contrary provisions of state election code). It also warrants mention that the
Democratic Party Court cited with approval Professor Lawrence Tribe who wrote,
“freedom of association would prove an empty guarantee if associations could not
limit control over their decisions to those who share the interests and persuasions
that underlie the association’s being.” Democratic Party, 450 U.S. at 122 n.22.
186. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222
(1989) (quoting Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 217).
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who constitute the association,’” and to select a “standard bearer
who best represents the party’s ideologies and preferences.”187
The Burdick majority arguably expressed a dim view of blan-
ket primaries.188  In a footnote, the majority addressed the dissent’s
argument that because primary voters are required to opt for a
specific partisan or nonpartisan ballot — as is the case in both
closed and traditional open primaries — they are foreclosed from
voting in those races in which no candidate appears on their cho-
sen ballot.  But, noted the majority, “this is generally true of pri-
maries; voters are required to select a ticket, rather than choose
from the universe of candidates running on all party slates.”189  The
Court went on to quote an earlier case in which it had held that
“‘the [s]tate may determine that it is essential to the integrity of
the nominating [petition] process to confine voters to supporting
one party and its candidates in the course of the same nominating
process.’”190
Subsequent to the O’Callaghan decision, the Supreme Court
in Timmons made the following highly pertinent observations:
The New Party’s claim that it has a right to select its own candi-
date is uncontroversial . . . . See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda . . .
(Party, not [s]tate, has right to decide who will be [s]tate’s dele-
gates at party convention.).  That is, the New Party, and not
someone else, has the right to select the New Party’s “standard
bearer.”191
Finally, the Court’s comments in an earlier case, Rodriguez v.
Popular Democratic Party,192 are also instructive.  In this case, the
Court was reviewing a Puerto Rico statute that gave a political
party the authority to appoint an interim replacement for a party
member who vacated a position in the legislature. When the ap-
pointing party excluded nonmembers of the party from the selec-
tion process, the nonmembers alleged a violation of their right of
association.  The Court, however, disagreed, writing, “The Party
was entitled to adopt its own procedures to select this replacement;
it was not required to include non-members in what can be analo-
gized to a party primary election.”193
187. Id. at 224 (quoting Tashjian,  479 U.S. at 214 (quoting Democratic Party,
450 U.S. at 122); Ripon Soc’y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567,
601 (D.C. Cir. 1975)) (citations omitted).
188. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 437 n.7 (1992).
189. Id.
190. Id. (quoting American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 786 (1974)).
191. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1997)
(emphasis added).
192. 457 U.S. 1 (1982).
193. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
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V. CONCLUSION
In upholding Alaska’s blanket primary statute, the Alaska Su-
preme Court committed two substantial errors, the result of which
has been a significant diminution of the associational rights of po-
litical parties and their members in Alaska.  The Court erred first
by misapplying the Anderson test and second by disregarding con-
trolling United States Supreme Court precedent.  In so doing, the
court has commenced the erosion of an important First Amend-
ment right.
It warrants mention that other jurisdictions, including Califor-
nia and Virginia, have recently grappled with the constitutionality
of blanket and open primary statutes.  In March 1996, California
voters approved Proposition 198, the “Open Primary Act,”194 pro-
viding for a blanket primary election in that state.195  The measure,
which goes into effect in 1998, provides that “[a]ll persons entitled
to vote, including those not affiliated with any political party, shall
have the right to vote, except as otherwise provided by law, at any
election in which they are qualified to vote, for any candidate re-
gardless of the candidate’s political affiliation.”196  Like Alaska’s
blanket primary statute, Proposition 198 squarely raises the issue
of whether political parties have a constitutionally-protected right
to prevent political opponents from participating in the selection of
party candidates.  The major political parties in California oppose
the law, and the Republican, Democratic, Libertarian, and Peace
& Freedom parties have challenged the new blanket primary law
in a lawsuit filed in federal court in Sacramento’s Eastern Dis-
trict.197  The case was heard by Judge David Levi in July 1997, and
the judge considered further arguments in September 1997.198
Also, a challenge to Virginia’s open primary law was brought
recently in federal court in Virginia by two state Republican Party
members, including the chairman of the state party.  The law pro-
vides that “[a]ll persons qualified to vote . . . may vote at the pri-
mary.  No person shall vote for the candidates of more than one
194. The appellation “Open Primary Act” is, in fact, a misnomer, for the pri-
mary system it adopts is actually a blanket, not open, primary.
195. See Cal. Prop. 198 (1996) (to be codified at CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2001
(West 1997)).
196. Id.
197. See California Democratic Party v. Jones, No. CIV-S-96-2038 (E.D. Cal.
filed Nov. 21, 1996).
198. See Telephone Interview with George Waters, of Olson, Hagel, Fong,
Leidigh, Waters & Fishburn, L.L.P., counsel of record for the Democratic, Liber-
tarian, and Peace & Freedom Parties of California (Aug. 19, 1997)  At the time
this Note went to press in November 1997, the court had not yet issued its deci-
sion.
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party.”199  This, then, establishes an open primary.
The plaintiffs in Marshall v. Meadows200 alleged that the open
primary law is an unconstitutional infringement on their right to
associate freely with other citizens for the advancement of shared
political objectives, a right guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.  Plaintiffs objected to the ability of Democrats and
independents, under the law, to participate in the selection of the
Republican nominee for United States Senate.201
The district court dismissed the action on procedural grounds
and did not address the merits of the case.  The basis of the dis-
missal was a lack of standing on the part of the plaintiffs,202 and
laches because the suit was commenced only ninety-five days be-
fore the scheduled primary.203  On January 24, 1997, the Fourth
Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs lacked standing, declined to ad-
dress whether an open primary injures a political party and its
members, and dismissed the appeal.204
Alaska’s blanket primary law also continues to face legal
challenge.  In February 1995, as the Alaska Supreme Court pre-
pared to consider O’Callaghan v. State, the Republican Party of
Alaska filed suit in federal district court in Alaska205 seeking de-
claratory and injunctive enforcement of the same Party rule at is-
sue in O’Callaghan, the rule that would limit participation in the
Republican primary election to registered Republicans, registered
independents, and persons who state no party preference when
registering to vote.206
After the Alaska Supreme Court’s April 1996 decision in
O’Callaghan, the District Court in July 1996 denied the plaintiffs’
motions for a preliminary injunction and for partial summary
judgment.207  District Judge H. Russel Holland denied the motion
for preliminary injunctive relief because, although “there is a
strong likelihood of plaintiffs’ success on the merits of the under-
lying constitutional issue,”208 there is also a “serious question” as to
whether the res judicata doctrine will preclude the plaintiffs from
199. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-530 (Michie 1997).
200. 921 F. Supp. 1490 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff’d, 105 F.3d 904 (4th Cir. 1997).
201. See id. at 1491, 1493.
202. The State Republican Party was not a plaintiff in the action; only its
chairman was involved.  See id. at 1492-93.
203. See id. at 1491, 1494.
204. See Marshall v. Meadows, 105 F.3d 904, 906-07 (4th Cir. 1997).
205. See Ross v. State, No. A95-0053-CV (D. Alaska filed Feb. 16, 1995).
206. See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief at 6-7, Ross v. State (No. A95-0053-CV).
207. See Order of July 17, 1996 at 2, Ross v. State (No. A95-0053-CV).
208. Id.
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relitigating the constitutionality of the blanket primary law.209 The
summary judgment motion was denied because “[t]he court has
not yet decided whether the plaintiffs’ associational rights which
are at issue in this case are to be subject to a strict scrutiny analy-
sis, or whether some less demanding test will apply.”210
Subsequently, likely in an effort to remedy the res judicata
problem noted by Judge Holland, plaintiffs filed a Third Amended
Complaint on July 31, 1997,211 alleging that Alaska’s blanket pri-
mary violates not just the state party rule at issue in O’Callaghan
but also Rule 34(f) of the National Republican Party.  This na-
tional party rule was enacted on August 12, 1996 and provides, in
pertinent part:
On or after January 1, 1997, no state law or party rule shall be
observed that allows persons who have participated or are par-
ticipating in the selection of any nominee of a party other than
the Republican Party, including, but not limited to, through the
use of a multi-party primary or similar type ballot, to participate
in the selection of a nominee of the Republican Party for that
general election.  No person nominated in violation of this rule
shall be recognized as the nominee of the Republican Party.  If
state law or state party rule provides for the selection of the
nominee of the Republican Party in violation of this rule, the
Republican nominee shall be selected by a convention . . . unless
a state party rule provides specifically to the contrary.212
In addition, the Alaska Libertarian Party, the Alaskan Independ-
ence Party, and former Lieutenant Governor John B. Coghill, now
the chairman of the Alaskan Independence Party, joined the suit
as plaintiffs.213
The continuing litigation surrounding open and blanket pri-
maries means that the United States Supreme Court likely will
again have the opportunity to rule definitively on the constitution-
ality of such primary elections.  It should do so, in the interest of
settling this significant question of constitutional law.
Brian M. Castro
209. Id. at 8.  Res judicata applies to state court determinations of federal con-
stitutional issues. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980).
210. Order of July 31, 1996 at 1, Ross v. State (No. A95-0053-CV).
211. Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive and
Other Relief at 8, Ross v. State (No. A95-0053-CV).
212. Id.
213. See id. at 3-4.
